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Sam Curren (Indicio) <sam@indicio.tech>

Matteo Midena (Monokee) <matteo.midena@monokee.com>


Related Repositories:

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  • Update on the AnonCreds V2.0 Working Group
    • The goal of AnonCreds v2.0 is to retain and extend the privacy-preserving features of AnonCreds v1.0, while improving capabilities, performance, extensibility, and security.
    • Next week's meeting: Data Model proposals from Mike Lodder
  • AnonCreds on Cardano - Presentation by Rodolfo Miranda 
  • Migrating to did:indy – can just happen?
    • Credentials issued to old identifiers - proof request has old identifiers, either unqualified or "did:sov" – there is an equivalent "did:indy"
    • Add to spec – unqualified and map them to "did:indy" automagically, or require the verifier to ask for both representations explicitly.
    • Timo Glastra to do a test to see the effort is supporting all flavours on receipt of a proof request and in verifying.  How painful is that to support?
  • AnonCreds, JSON-LD, W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Model Standard and the VCWG
    • On step further in aligning with JSON-LD – signing the hash of the @context  RDF tuple WITHOUT credential data.  Good idea?
    • The VCWG Miami F2F – the resolution to the "Big Tent" issue.
  • PRs for review and merging
    • AnonCreds Rust 102 – handling combinations of Revoked/Non-Revoked presentations
      • Timestamp
      • Handling of both revocable and non-revocable credentials in a single presentation in all cases (bug in older implementation).
    • ANDs and ORs in the spec. are wrong – need to update the specification.
  • Issues to Discuss – notably, issues that are ready to be closed.
  • Checkin: anoncreds-rs implementation progress, requests
  • Open Discussion:
    • Ideas on how to link from the specification to the cryptographic operations?
    • Discussion from several weeks ago – having an intermediary collect presentations from holders and then share them with the final verifier.
      • Use Case:
        • A bus is visiting a secure site for which all visitors must present ID.
        • Site sends the bus operator a nonce.
        • The bus operator uses the nonce in a presentation request flow with each passenger.
        • Bus operator verifies all of the presentations.
        • The Bus operator forwards all of the presentations to the site for verification.
      • Questions:
        • Is there value in the use of the nonce in this way?
        • Does this alter the cryptography in any way?
        • Terms of use of the data received by the bus operator?
      • Discussion to be carried forward to next week.
    • Proposal: Should we move attribute encoding into the specification and out of the hands of the issuer?
      • Approach:
        • Deprecate the inclusion of encoded values from the "sign credential" process
        • If passed, recalculate and error if they don't match the canonicalization algorithm
          • If integer or string integer - leave as is
          • Else stringify and hash
        • In presentation – recalculate on use, as needed.

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