Anonymous credentials 2.0

Michael Lodder, Dmitry Khovratovich

26 February 2019, version 0.2

1 Introduction

1.1 Concept

The concept of anonymous credentials allows users to prove that their identity satisfies certain properties in an uncorrelated way without revealing other identity details. The properties can be raw identity attributes such as the birth date or the address, or more sophisticated predicates such as “A is older than 20 years old”.

We assume three parties: issuer, holder, and verifier. From the functional perspective, the issuer gives a credential $C$ based on identity schema $X$, which asserts certain properties $P$ about $X$, to the holder. The credential consists of attributes represented by integers $m_1, m_2, \ldots, m_l$. The holder then presents $(P, C)$ to the Verifier, which can verify that the issuer has asserted that holder’s identity has property $P$.

1.2 Properties

Credentials are unforgeable in the sense that no one can fool the Verifier with a credential not prepared by the issuer.

We say that credentials are unlinkable if it is impossible to correlate the presented credential across multiple presentations. This is implemented by the holder proving with a zero-knowledge proof that he has a credential rather than showing the credential.

Unlinkability can be simulated by the issuer generating a sufficient number of ordinary unrelated credentials. Also unlinkability can be turned off to make credentials one-time use so that second and later presentations are detected.

1.3 Pseudonyms

Typically a credential is bound to a certain pseudonym $nym$. It is supposed that holder has been registered as $nym$ at the issuer, and communicated (part of) his identity $X$ to him. After that the issuer can issue a credential that couples $nym$ and $X$.

The holder may have a pseudonym at the Verifier, but not necessarily. If there is no pseudonym then the issuer provides the service to users who did not register. If the pseudonym $nym_V$ is required, it can be generated from a link secret $m_1$ together with $nym$ in a way that $nym$ can not be linked to $nym_V$. However, holder is supposed to prove that the credential presented was issued to a pseudonym derived from the same link secret as used to produce $nym_V$.

An identity owner also can create a policy address $I$ that is used for managing agent proving authorization. The address are tied to credentials issued to holders such that agents cannot use these credentials without authorization.

2 Generic notation

- Attribute $m$ is a $l_a$-bit unsigned integer.\(^1\)
- $||$ means byte concatenation e.g. $a = 0100$, $b = 1001$, $a||b \leftrightarrow 01001001$
- $H()$ denotes a cryptographic hash function

\(^1\)Technically it is possible to support credentials with different $l_a$, but in Sovrin for simplicity it is set $l_a = 256$. 

3 Protocol Overview

The described protocol supports anonymous credentials given to multiple holders by various issuers, which are presented to various relying parties.

Various types of anonymous credentials can be supported. In this section, BBS+²-based credentials with external proofs are described. External proofs are proofs of statements about attribute values, that are performed in other proof systems and are described in other documents. Examples are range proofs and AuthZ proofs using the Bulletproofs framework. For this, Holder creates separate commitments, one per attribute value, and includes the proof of correctness into the BBS+ proof of signature knowledge. Holder then presents external proofs using these commitments.

The simplest credential lifecycle with one credential, single issuer, holder, and verifier is as follows:

1. Issuer determines a credential schema $S$: the type of cryptographic signatures used to sign the credentials, the number $l$ of attributes in a credential, the indices $A_h \subset \{1, 2, \ldots, l\}$ of hidden attributes, the public key $P_k$, the non-revocation credential attribute number $l_r$ and non-revocation public key $P_r$ (Section 4). Then he publishes it on the ledger and announces the attribute semantics.

2. Holder retrieves the credential schema from the ledger and sets the hidden attributes.

3. Holder requests a credential from issuer. He sends hidden attributes in a blinded form to issuer and agrees on the values of known attributes $A_k = \{1, 2, \ldots, l\} \setminus A_h$.

4. Issuer sets the attribute he controls, including the credential index (used for non-revocation) and returns credential $C$ to holder. Issuer adds the index to the accumulator of issued credentials.

5. Holder approaches verifier. Verifier sends the Proof Request $E$ to holder. The Proof Request contains the credential schema $S_E$ disclosure predicates $D$ (range predicates, inequalities, set (non-)membership), and AuthZ specification $A$. Some attributes may be asserted to be the same: $m_i = m_j$.

6. Holder checks that the credential pair he holds satisfy the schema $S_E$. He retrieves the non-revocation witness from the ledger or another storage.

7. Holder creates a proof $P$ that he has a non-revoked credential satisfying the proof request $E$ and sends it to verifier.

8. Verifier verifies the proof.

If there are multiple issuers, the holder obtains credentials from them independently. To allow credential chaining, issuers reserve one attribute (usually $m_1$) for a secret value hidden by holder. Holder is supposed then to set it to the same value in all credentials, whereas Relying Parties require them to be equal along all credentials. A proof request should specify then a list of schemas that credentials should satisfy in certain order.

²See section 4.3-5.1
4 Schema preparation

Credentials should have limited use to only authorized holder entities called agents. Agents can prove authorization to use a credential by including a policy address \( I \) in primary credentials as attribute \( m_3 \).

4.1 Attributes

Issuer defines the credential schema \( S \) with \( l \) attributes \( m_1, m_2, \ldots, m_l \) and the set of hidden attributes \( D_P \subset \{ 1, 2, \ldots, l \} \). In Sovrin, \( m_1 \) is reserved for the link secret of the holder, \( m_2 \) is reserved for the credential index, \( m_3 \) is reserved for the policy address \( I \). By default, \( 1 \in D_P \) whereas \( 2, 3 \notin D_P \). Let us denote \( D_I = \{ 1, 2, \ldots, l \} \setminus D_P \).

4.2 Credential Cryptographic Setup

In Sovrin, issuers use BBS+ for primary credentials, although other signature types will be supported too. The BBS+ issuer chooses a pairing friendly curve. Sovrin uses BLS12-381.

1. Issuer sets up a pairing operation on BLS12-381:
   \[
   e : G_1 \times G_2 \rightarrow G_T,
   \]
   where groups \( G_1, G_2, G_T \) have prime order \( p \).

2. Issuer prepares for group \( G_1 \):
   - Randomly chosen generators \( \hat{g}_1, h_0, h_1, \ldots, h_L \).

3. Issuer prepares for group \( G_2 \):
   - Random generator \( g_2 \).
   - Random integer \( x < p \).
   - Computes \( w = g_2^x \).

Issuer’s public key for schema \( S \) is
\[
 pk_I = \{ \hat{g}_1, h_0, h_1, \ldots, h_L, g_2, w \}.
\]

Issuer’s secret key is \( x \).
Therefore, \( S \) consists of the following elements:
\[
 S = \{ \Phi, D_I, pk_I \}
\]

4.2.1 Proof of Setup Correctness

Issuer also creates the proof of knowledge of the secret key \( x \) (if needed):
1. \( \overline{g}_1 \) is random element of \( G_1 \).
2. \( \overline{g}_2 \leftarrow \overline{g}_1^x \);
3. \( r \) is a random integer \( < p \).
4. \[
 t_1 \leftarrow g_2^r; \quad t_2 \leftarrow \overline{g}_1^r; \\
 c \leftarrow H(\overline{g}_1||\overline{g}_2||\hat{g}_1||g_2||t_1||t_2); \\
 s \leftarrow r - cx;
 \]

Proof \( \pi \leftarrow (\overline{g}_1, \overline{g}_2, t_1, t_2, s, c) \). To verify the proof, Holder computes
\[
 t'_1 \leftarrow g_2^s w^c; \quad t'_2 \leftarrow \overline{g}_1^s \overline{g}_2^c;
\]
and checks if
\[
 c = H(\overline{g}_1||\overline{g}_2||\hat{g}_1||g_2||t'_1||t'_2)
\]
4.3 Non-revocation Cryptographic Setup

In AnonCreds 2.0 issuers use Merkle trees to track revocation status of credentials. Each credential is given an index from 1 to \( L = 2^q \), and indices of non-revoked credentials are the Merkle tree leaves.

Let \( V \) denote the set of non-revoked indices, and \( H \) be the Merkle tree hash function.

Then we define

\[
H[i] = \begin{cases} 
    H(i); & \text{if } i \in V \\
    0; & \text{if } i \notin V
\end{cases}
\]

\( H[2i,2i+1] = H(H[2i], H[2i+1]); \quad H[2^k i, 2^k i + 2^k - 1] = H(H[2^k i, 2^k i + 2^k - 1], H[2^k i + 2^k, 2^k i + 2^k - 1]) \).

Let us denote by \(+i\) the addition of non-revoked index \( i \) to the tree, and by \(-i\) the removal of index \( i \) from the tree \( T \).
5 Issuance of Credentials

5.1 Holder Setup

Holder:
- Loads credential schema \( S \).
- Sets hidden attributes \( \{m_i\}_{i \in D_P} \).
- Establishes a connection with issuer and gets 128-bit nonce \( n_0 \) either from issuer or as a precomputed value.

Holder prepares data for the credential:
1. Generate random
   - \( s' \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \)
   - \( \tilde{s}' \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \)
   - \( \{r_i\}_{i \in D_P} \)
2. Compute taking \( h_0, \{h_i\} \) from \( pk_I \):
   \[
   U \leftarrow (h_0^{s'}) \prod_{i \in D_P} h_i^{m_i} \quad (5)
   \]
   \[
   \tilde{U} \leftarrow (h_0^{\tilde{s}'}) \prod_{i \in D_P} h_i^{r_i} \quad c \leftarrow H(U || \tilde{U} || n_0); \quad (6)
   \]
   \[
   \tilde{s}' \leftarrow \tilde{s}' - cs'; \quad \{\hat{r}_i \leftarrow r_i - cm_i\}_{i \in D_P} \quad (7)
   \]
3. Send \( \{U, c, \tilde{s}', \{\hat{r}_i\}_{i \in D_P}\} \) to the issuer.

5.2 Credential Issuance

1. Issuer receives \( U \).
2. Issuer verifies the correctness of holder’s input:
   (a) Compute \( \tilde{U} \leftarrow (U^c)(h_0^{s'}) \prod_{i \in D_I} h_i^{r_i} \)
   (b) Verify \( c = H(U || \tilde{U} || n_0) \)
3. Issuer determines the attributes he controls: \( \{m_i\}_{i \in D_I} \). Let the credential index be \( i_0 \), i.e. \( m_2 = i_0 \).
4. Issuer generates random \( e, s'' \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \).
5. Issuer computes
   \[
   B \leftarrow \hat{g}_1 U h_0^{s''} \prod_{i \in D_I} h_i^{m_i}; \quad A \leftarrow B^{1/e}; \quad (8)
   \]
   \[
   V \leftarrow V \cup \{i_0\}; \quad T \leftarrow T + i_0. \quad (9)
   \]
6. Issuer returns \( (A, e, s'', \{m_i\}_{i \in D_I}) \).
7. Issuer publishes updated \( V, T \) on the ledger.
8. Prover computes
   \[
   B \leftarrow \hat{g}_1 g_2 U h_0^{s''} \prod_{i \in D_I} h_i^{m_i}; \quad (10)
   \]
9. Prover verifies
   \[
   e(A, wg_2^x) = e(B, g_2). \quad (11)
   \]
10. Prover stores credential \( \mathcal{C} = \{(m_i)_{1 \leq i \leq L}, A, e,(s' + s'') \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p\} \).
6 Revocation

Issuer identifies a credential to be revoked in the database and retrieves its index $i$, the accumulator value $A$, and valid index set $V$. Then he proceeds:

1. Set $V \leftarrow V \setminus \{i\}$;
2. Compute $T \leftarrow T - i$.
3. Publish $\{V, T\}$.
7 Presentation

7.1 Proof Request

Verifier sends a proof request, where it specifies the ordered set of $d$ credential schemas \( \{S_1, S_2, \ldots, S_d\} \), so that the holder should provide a set of $d$ credentials $C$ that correspond to these schemas.

Let credentials in these schemas contain $X$ attributes in total. Suppose that the request makes to open $x_1$ attributes, makes to prove $x_2$ equalities $m_i = m_j$ (from possibly distinct schemas) and makes to prove some external predicates (range or set proofs). Then effectively $X - x_1$ attributes are unknown (denote them $A_h$), which form $x_3 = (X - x_1 - x_2)$ equivalence classes. Let $\phi$ map $A_h$ to \{1, 2, \ldots, $x_3$\} according to this equivalence. Let $A_v$ denote the set of indices of $x_1$ attributes that are disclosed. Let $D_v$ denote the set of indices for which a predicate proof is computed.

The proof request thus specifies $A_h, \phi, A_v$ and predicate data:

- For each range proof $m_i \in [a, b]$ – two statements $a \leq m_i < 2^n$ and $m_i \leq b \leq 2^n$ for some $n < 255$.
- For inequality: statement $m_i \neq a$.
- For non-revocation proof specify Merkle tree $T$ and the attribute responsible for the credential index $m_2$ to prove that $m_2 \in T$.
- For proof of membership of attribute $m_i$ in some Merkle tree $T'$ the statements $m_i \in T'$.
- For proof of membership of attribute $m_i$ in set $S$ the statement $m_i \in S$.
- For proof of non-membership of attribute $m_i$ in sparse Merkle tree $T'$ the statements $m_i \in T'$.
- For proof of non-membership of attribute $m_i$ in set $S$ the statement $m_i \in S$.
- For proof of AuthZ: Merkle tree membership statement $I \in T$.

All these predicates are proven in external proofs, independently of each other.

Along with a proof request, Verifier also generates and sends 128-bit nonce $n_1$. The predicate proof is computed separately from the credential correctness proof by using the commitments to $m_i$ values generated in the latter.

7.2 Proof Preparation

Holder prepares for each credential:

1. Generate random $\{\overline{m}_i\}_{i \in D}$ of length 256 bits (group size).
2. Run Algorithm 1 with inputs $D, C, \{\overline{m}_i\}_{i \in D}, D_r$. The outputs $R, \mathcal{T}$ are added to $R_{full}, \mathcal{T}_{full}$, and outputs $U, \mathcal{S}_r$ is stored.
3. Compute $c_H \leftarrow H(R_{full}, \mathcal{T}_{full}, n_0)$.
4. For each $j \notin D$ compute $\widehat{m}_j \leftarrow \overline{m}_j + c_H m_j \mod p$ and add $\{\overline{m}_i\}_{i \in D}$ to $\mathcal{P}_{full}$.
5. Run Algorithm 2 with inputs $c_H, e, U$ and add output $\mathcal{P}$ to $\mathcal{P}_{full}$.
6. Send $\{c_H, R_{full}, \mathcal{P}_{full}, \{m_i\}_{i \in D}\}$ to Verifier.

Holder prepares and sends external proofs:

1. For each predicate $2^n > m_i \geq a$ run Algorithm 4 on the input $\{n, w_i = m_i - a, s'_i\}$. The output proof $\pi$ is sent to Verifier.
2. For each predicate $2^n > a \geq m_i$ run Algorithm 4 on the input $\{n, w_i = a - m_i, s'_i\}$. The output proof $\pi$ is sent to Verifier.
3. For each inequality $m_i \neq a$ run Algorithm 6 on the input $\{w_i = m_i - a, s'_i\}$.
4. For each Merkle set membership predicate $m_i \in T$ run Algorithm 8 on input $(m_i, s'_i, \mathcal{T}, \mathcal{C}_O)$where $\mathcal{C}_O$ is the circuit description for the opening verification. The output proof $\pi$ is sent to Verifier.
5. For each Merkle set non-membership predicate $m_i \in \mathcal{T}$ run Algorithm 10 on input $(m_i, s'_i, \mathcal{T}, \mathcal{C}_O)$. The output proof $\pi$ is sent to Verifier.
6. For each linear set membership predicate $m_i \in S$ run Algorithm 12 on input $(m_i, s'_i, S)$. The output proof $\pi$ is sent to Verifier.

7. For each linear set non-membership predicate $m_i \in S$ run Algorithms 14 on input $(m_i, s'_i, S)$. The output proof $\pi$ is sent to Verifier.

7.3 Verification

For the credential $C$:

1. Run Algorithm 3 with inputs $R, P, \{m_i\}_{i \in D}, \{\hat{m}_i\}_{i \notin D}$. Add output $\hat{T}$ to $\hat{T}_{full}$.

2. Check that

$$e_H = H(\mathcal{R}_{full}, \hat{T}_{full}, n_0)$$

3. Check that

$$e(A', w) = e(\mathcal{A}, g_2) \quad (12)$$

For external proof verification:

1. For each predicate $2^n > m_j \geq v_i$ run Algorithm 5 with input $\{n, Z'_i = Z_i / h_{1,i}^{v_i}, \pi\}$.

2. For each predicate $m_j \leq v_i < 2^n$ run Algorithm 5 with input $\{n, Z'_i = h_{1,i}^{v_i} / Z_i, \pi\}$.

3. For each inequality $m_i \neq a$ run Algorithm 7 on the input $\{Z'_i = Z_i h_{1}^{-a}, \pi\}$.

4. For each Merkle set membership predicate $m_i \in T$ verify the Bulletproof proof $\pi$ by Algorithm 9 on input $(Z_i, \pi, R_T, C_\mathcal{O})$.

5. For each linear set membership predicate $m_i \in S$ verify the Bulletproof proof $\pi$ by Algorithm 13 on input $(Z_i, S, \pi)$.

6. For each Merkle set non-membership predicate $m_i \in T$ verify the Bulletproof proof $\pi$ by Algorithm 11 on input $(Z_i, \pi, R_T, C_\mathcal{O})$.

7. For each linear set non-membership predicate $m_i \in S$ verify the Bulletproof proof $\pi$ by Algorithm 15 on input $(Z_i, S, \pi)$.
8 Algorithms

Algorithm 1 Selective disclosure: commitment step

Input: $D, C = \{\{m_i\}_{1 \leq i \leq L}, A, e, s, \{\tilde{m}_i\}_{i \in D,} \}$

1. Generate random $r_1, r_2, \tilde{e}, \tilde{r}_2, \tilde{r}_3, \tilde{s}$;
2. For commitments, generate random $\{s'_i\}_{i \in D_r}$ and compute
   \[Z_i \leftarrow h_{m_i}h_0^i, \text{ } i \in D_r.\]
3. Compute
   \[\begin{align*}
   &B \leftarrow \hat{g}h_0^i \prod_{1 \leq i \leq L} h_{m_i}^i \\
   &A' \leftarrow A^{r_1} \\
   &\tilde{A} \leftarrow A^{-e} B^{r_1} \\
   &d \leftarrow B^{r_2} h_0^{r_3} \\
   &r_3 \leftarrow r_1^{-1} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \\
   &s' \leftarrow s - r_2 r_3 \\
   &t_1 \leftarrow A^{r_2} h_0^{r_3} \\
   &t_2 \leftarrow d^{r_3} h_0^{s'} \prod_{i \in D_r} h_{m_i}^{i - \tilde{m}_i} \\
   &R \leftarrow \hat{g} \prod_{i \in D_r} h_{m_i}^i \\
   &t'_i \leftarrow h_{m_i}h_0^{s_i}, \text{ } i \in D_r.
   \end{align*}\]

Output: $R = \{A', \tilde{A}, d, R, \{Z_i\}_{i \in D_r}\}, T = \{t_1, t_2, r_1, r_2, r_3, s'\}, U = \{\tilde{e}, \tilde{r}_2, \tilde{r}_3, \tilde{s'}, \{s'_i\}_{i \in D_r}\}, S_r = \{s'_i\}$

Algorithm 2 Selective disclosure: opening step

Input: $c_H, e, r_1, r_2, r_3, s', \{\tilde{m}_i\}_{i \in D,} U = \{\tilde{e}, \tilde{r}_2, \tilde{r}_3, \tilde{s'}\}$

1. Compute
   \[\begin{align*}
   &\tilde{e} \leftarrow \tilde{e} - c_H e; \quad \tilde{r}_2 \leftarrow \tilde{r}_2 - c_H r_2; \quad \tilde{r}_3 \leftarrow \tilde{r}_3 - c_H r_3; \quad \tilde{s'} \leftarrow \tilde{s'} - c_H s'; \\
   &\{s'_i \leftarrow s'_i - c_H s'_i\}_{i \in D_r};
   \end{align*}\]

Output: $R = \{A', \tilde{A}, d, R\}, U = \{\tilde{e}, \tilde{r}_2, \tilde{r}_3, \tilde{s'}, \{s'_i\}_{i \in D_r}\}$. 

Algorithm 3  Selective disclosure: Verification step

Input: $cH, R = \{A', \bar{A}, d, R, \{Z_i\}\}, \mathcal{P} = \{\bar{e}, \bar{r}_2, \bar{r}_3, \bar{s}', \{\bar{s}'_i\}_{i \in D_r}, \{m_i\}_{i \in D}, \{\bar{m}_i\}_{i \in D}$

1. Check that $A' \neq 1$;

2. Compute

$$\hat{t}_1 \leftarrow (\bar{A}/d)^{cH} A'^{-\bar{e}} h_0^{\bar{s}'};$$

$$\hat{t}_2 \leftarrow R^{cH} d^{s} h_0^{-\bar{r}_3} \prod_{i \in D} h_i^{-\bar{m}_i}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (13)

$$\hat{t}'_i \leftarrow Z_i^{cH} h_0^{\bar{s}'_i}, i \in D_r.$$  \hspace{1cm} (15)

Output: $\hat{T} = \{\hat{t}_1, \hat{t}_2, \{\hat{t}'_i\}_{i \in D_r}\}$.

Algorithm 4  Range Bulletproofs: proof generation

Input: $\{n, w_i = m_i - v_i, s'_i\}$

1. Call the Bulletproof range proof routine to prove that $Z'_i = h_1^{w_i} h_0^{s'_i}$ is a commitment to value $w_i$ such that $0 < w_i < 2^n$. See Section 4 of the Bulletproofs paper.

2. The range proof routine returns $\pi$.

Output: $\pi$.

Algorithm 5  Range Bulletproofs: verification step

Input: $\{n, Z'_i, \pi\}$

1. Call the Bulletproof proof verification routine to verify that $Z'_i$ is a commitment to value $w_i$ such that $0 < w_i < 2^n$.

Output: accept if successful or $\bot$ on failure

Algorithm 6  Inequality Bulletproofs: proof generation

Input: $\{w_i, s'_i\}$

1. Call the Bulletproof inequality gadget to prove that $Z'_i = h_1^{w_i} h_0^{s'_i}$ is a commitment to value $w_i$ such that $w_i \neq 0$. The idea is to create a pair of constraints valid only for such $w_i$ (see the Pinocchio paper).

2. The gadget returns $\pi$.

Output: $\pi$.

Algorithm 7  Inequality Bulletproofs: verification step

Input: $\{Z'_i, \pi\}$

1. Call the Bulletproof proof verification gadget to verify that $Z'_i$ is a commitment to value $w_i$ such that $w_i \neq 0$.

Output: accept if successful or $\bot$ on failure

Algorithm 8  Merkle tree membership Bulletproofs: proof generation

Input: $\{m, s'_i, \mathcal{T}, C_O\}$

1. Extract the opening $O$ for $m$ in $\mathcal{T}$.

2. Call the Bulletproof proof gadget on the circuit $C_O$ with inputs $m, O, R_T$ where $R_T$ is the root of $\mathcal{T}$ using the existing commitment $Z_i = h_1^{m} h_0^{s'_i}$ to $m$.

3. The gadget returns $\pi$.

Output: $\pi$. 

10
Algorithm 9 Merkle tree membership Bulletproofs: verification step
Input: \{Z_i, \pi, R_T, C_O\}

1. Call the Bulletproof proof verification gadget to verify the proof \(\pi\) that \(Z_i\) is a commitment to value \(m\) that opens to \(R_T\) using the circuit \(C_O\).

Output: accept if successful or \(\bot\) on failure

Algorithm 10 Merkle tree non-membership Bulletproofs: proof generation
Input: \{m, s'_i, T, C_O\}

1. Extract the opening \(O\) for \(\emptyset\) in the place of \(m\) in sparse Merkle tree \(T\).
2. Call the Bulletproof proof non-membership gadget on the circuit \(C_O\) with inputs \(m, O, R_T\) where \(R_T\) is the root of \(T\) using the existing commitment \(Z_i = h_m h_{s'_i}^\emptyset\) to \(m\).
3. The gadget returns \(\pi\).

Output: \(\pi\).

Algorithm 11 Merkle tree non-membership Bulletproofs: verification step
Input: \{Z_i, \pi, R_T, C_O\}

1. Call the Bulletproof proof verification gadget to verify the proof \(\pi\) that \(Z_i\) is a commitment to value \(m\) such that \(\emptyset\) opens to sparse Merkle root \(R_T\) in the position of \(m\) using the circuit \(C_O\).

Output: accept if successful or \(\bot\) on failure

Algorithm 12 Linear set memberships: proof generation
Input: \(m_j, s'_j, \text{set } S\) of length \(n\)

1. Create bit vector \(v \in \{0, 1\}^n\) with the index of \(m_j\) in set \(S\) to 1 and all others to 0.
2. Generate random values \(\{r_i \mod p\}_{1 \leq i \leq n}\)
3. Generate random value \(r_j \mod p\)
4. Compute commitment vector using bullet proof generators \(g, h\): \(a \leftarrow g_a h_{r_i}^{r_i}\)
5. Compute commitment for value using bulletproof value generators: \(V \leftarrow g^{m_j} h_{r_j}\)
6. Perform other steps to get proof \(\pi\).

Output: \(\pi\).

Algorithm 13 Linear membership Bulletproofs: verification
Input: \(\{Z_i, \pi, S\}\)

1. Call the Bulletproof proof verification gadget to verify the proof \(\pi\) that \(Z_i\) is a commitment to value \(m \in S\).

Output: accept if successful or \(\bot\) on failure

Algorithm 14 Linear non-membership Bulletproofs: proof generation
Input: \(\{m_i, s'_i, S\}\)

1. Call the Bulletproof proof generation gadget to create proof \(\pi\) that \(Z_i\) is a commitment to value \(m\) that is not in the set \(S\). Idea: show that for each element of \(S\) it is not equal to the committed value using the existing commitment \(Z_i = h_m h_{s'_i}^\emptyset\) to \(m\).
2. The gadget returns \(\pi\).

Output: \(\pi\)
Algorithm 15 Linear non-membership Bulletproofs: proof verification

Input: \{Z_i, \pi, S\}

1. Call the Bulletproof proof verification gadget to verify the proof \(\pi\) that \(Z_i\) is a commitment to value \(m\) that is not in the set \(S\). Idea: show that for each element of \(S\) it is not equal to the committed number.

Output: accept if successful or \(\bot\) on failure