# HYPERLEDGER AVALON (VIRTUAL MEETUP WITH HYPERLEDGER AVALON AND CHAINLINK)

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
### Agenda

- Hyperledger Avalon at Glance
- Confidential Compute and Trusted Execution Environments (TEE) Intro
- Background and Usages
- Challenges of Bridging Confidential Compute and Blockchains
- Architecture



# Extending Computational Trust beyond Blockchain

- Hyperledger Avalon
  - Improves blockchain scalability and confidentiality
  - Utilizes HW based Trusted Execution Environments
  - Running side-by-side with blockchain
  - Blockchain neutral
- Standard based reference implementation
  - Implements EEA (Enterprise Ethereum Alliance) Off-Chain Trusted Compute (TC) Specification
  - Top level Hyperledger project sponsored by 16 companies and organizations
- Links
  - TC spec: Off-Chain-TC-Spec-Link
  - Github: <u>https://github.com/hyperledger/avalon</u>
  - Project: <u>Proposal</u> and <u>Announcement</u>



- Alibaba Cloud
- Baidu
- Banco Santander
- BGI
- Chainlink
- Consensys
- EEA
- Espeo

IBM

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- Intel
- iExec
- Kaleido
- Microsoft
- Monax
- Oracle
- WiPro



## Confidential Compute and Trusted Execution Environments (TEE) Intro



# **Confidential Computing Protects Data IN-USE**



# Protecting data in use by performing computation within hardware-based Trusted Execution Environments (TEE),

especially, when it takes place in a platform or environment, we do not directly control

TEE provides secure enclaves, memory encryption and attestation



#### **TEE - Trusted Execution Environment**


Intel<sup>®</sup> Software Guard Extensions, aka SGX as an example

#### Protects against:

- Malicious insiders
- External attackers
- 3<sup>rd</sup>-Parties without consent


#### Intel<sup>®</sup> SGX Based TEE Attributes:

- A trusted enclave can be created by user mode app at any time
- Enclave isolates code and data from app, OS, and VMM
- Built-in extendable attestation mechanism (verifiable by a remote party)





# MEMORY Protection Outside CPU



- Security perimeter is the CPU package boundary
- Data and code unencrypted inside CPU package
- Data and code outside CPU package is encrypted and integrity checked
- Increases likelihood that external memory reads and bus snoops see only encrypted data



#### **Attestation: Code Integrity & Authenticity**

- You deploy (signed) code on the remote platform
- HW signs an attestation of the enclave identity and TCB level
- Deploy secrets and trust execution results



#### Enclave memory is measured against your (signed) code



### **Attestation: Code Integrity & Authenticity**

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This is the right app executing in the right platform



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
Protecting keys, code (e.g. scripts, models), input and output data



**Background and Usages** 




#### **On-chain execution of smart contracts**




- Enterprise A and Enterprise B agree to execute a smart contract with terms and policies specific to their transaction.
- The smart contract is executed on the blockchain
- The transaction data is visible to all participants on the chain and is recorded on each blockchain node.
- Communication is facilitated through the blockchain.



#### Off-chain execution of smart contracts



- Enterprises A and B execute a smart contract off-chain by a Trusted Compute Worker
- The TC Worker (code, platform) can be attested and the attestation can be verified by other parties
- The attested TC Worker (aka black box) is the only who can see full transaction details and it enforces transaction policy, confidentiality and integrity
- The blockchain stores transaction receipts cryptographic representations of the transactions
- Communication between the TCS and enterprises can be direct via JRPC or through the blockchain




- The smart contract is executed on the blockchain
- Execution is replicated by each blockchain node
- Sensor data are universally visible, stored on the blockchain

• Smart contract execution is off-chain; the blockchain is an arbiter


- Smart contract is executed securely within a trusted worker
- Sensor data stored according to the contract policies

# **Confidential Compute Example**




- A Business wants to get a group medical insurance quote from the insurance company, authorizes access to medical records of its employees
- An Insurance Company (to determine a quote) calculates a heart disease risk factor in an attested trusted execution environment
- Hospitals maintain medical records of the employees and provide them for the assessment, but only in an attested trusted execution environment (that enforces confidentiality)








# Example of Privacy Preserved Covid19 Tracking



#### Challenges of Bridging Confidential Compute and Blockchains




#### Asynchronous Model



• Establishes asynchronous compute model Standard based, critical for decentralized usages and micro-services (aka FaaS)



#### **Cross-TEE Execution**




• Establishes asynchronous compute model Standard based, critical for decentralized usages and micro-services (aka FaaS)

#### • Facilitates Cross-TEE Execution Enables new usages (CFL) and improves integrity of links to legacy apps, sensors, data




# Scalability



- Establishes asynchronous compute model Standard based, critical for decentralized usages and micro-services (aka FaaS)
- Facilitates Cross-TEE Execution Enables new usages (CFL) and improves integrity of links to legacy apps, sensors, data
- Enables scalability & multitenancy Addressing SGX bond to a specific system. Works with existing orchestrators, K8S, OpenNESS




### **Integration of Various TEE Runtimes**



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- Supports variety of TEE options Mixing apps with different TCBs (SGX SDK, Open Enclave, LibOS runtimes) and different TEEs




## Mitigating Potential Application Vulnerabilities



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- **Reduces impact of vulnerabilities** By isolating key management from the work order execution



### **Avalon Objectives**




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#### Architecture



### Hyperledger Avalon High Level Architecture




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#### **Processing Flow**

|  |  | Requ | lester                       | Block<br>(Interm |                  | T(<br>Middl  | CF<br>eware                   | Tru:<br>Wo | sted<br>rker       |  | pp<br>kload | ]                                     |
|--|--|------|------------------------------|------------------|------------------|--------------|-------------------------------|------------|--------------------|--|-------------|---------------------------------------|
| r Establish chain of trust: AVR,<br>signing key, encryption keys | Enclave Registration - AVR – attestation verification report - verification/signing key pair - One or more encryption key pairs Optional, pool creatian, its detailed flow is not shown on the diagram Enclave discovery - Lookup and select enclave - Validate enclave AVR and keys - Store keys for further use Work order Invocation - Create and store one-time data encryption key - Encrypt data with DK | (DK) | Veri<br>encl<br>Prep<br>requ |                  | Register enclave | AVR, keys    | Create Worke<br>Request Attes |            | 👞 keys a           | ite enclave<br>and quote<br>Report (AVR) |             | Attestation<br>Service<br>(IAS, DCAP) |
| rk ordei   | <ul> <li>Encrypt DK with enclave key</li> <li>Generate request hash; encrypt it with DK</li> <li>Optionally, signed the request</li> </ul>   |      | Submit Work Order Request    |                  | Get Work Order R | equest       | Dispatch to the               | pool       |                    |  |             |                                       |
| Privacy preserving work order<br>processing                      | Work order execution<br>- Decrypt DK; decrypt data and request hash<br>- Verify request integrity<br>- Invoke a workload to process the workorder<br>- Encrypt request data with DK and sign the respo   | mse  |                              |                  |                  |              |                               |            | order<br>Invoke wo | re work orde                             |             | External Data<br>or TEE               |
| Privacy p  | Processing work order response<br>- Verify enclave's signature provided with the resp<br>- Use (saved) DK to decrypt response data<br>- Use response data as needed<br>Optionally, both requesters and TCS may create an   |      | _                            | Corder response  | Submit Work Or   | der response | Receive respo                 | nse        | Trusted V          | Vorker Pool                              |             |                                       |
|  | update work order receipts; not shown on the diag  |      | Proce                        | ss WO response   |                  | i            |                               | _!_        |                    |  | !           |                                       |

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## **Chain of Trust**




• One-time private key is stored in the enclave memory (not shown)

# Work Order Confidentiality and Integrity


- Requester
  - Generates one time symmetric encryption AES-GCM-256 key (SEK)
  - Encrypts work order request data with SEK
  - Calculates SHA256 hash of the request and encrypts it with SEK
  - Encrypts SEK with enclave's public (RSA-OAEP) encryption key
  - Optionally, signs the SHA256 hash using its verification key
- Worker (trusted code inside of SGX enclave)
  - Decrypts one time symmetric encryption AES-GCM-256 key (SEK)
  - Decrypts work order request data
  - Calculates SHA256 hash of the request
  - Decrypts SHA256 hash provided in the request and compares it with the calculated value above
  - If the signature of request's SHA256 hash is provided, verifies it using requester's key
  - Processes work order
  - Encrypts work order response data with SEK
  - Calculates SHA256 hash of the response
  - Signs the hash value with enclave's private signing key



### **Pinned Workers**



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# Thank you!

Get involved with Hyperledger Avalon

- GUTHUB: <u>https://github.com/hyperledger/avalon</u>
- Tutorial: <a href="https://github.com/hyperledger/avalon/tree/master/docs/workload-tutorial">https://github.com/hyperledger/avalon/tree/master/docs/workload-tutorial</a>
- Docs, links: <u>https://github.com/hyperledger/avalon/tree/master/docs</u>

